Rhetoric

By Aristotle — Stylized and condensed in the manner of Strunk & White

Presented without commentary, save the following Editor's Note:

I constructed this (with LLM assistance) because I tried to read the original text (which may be found here) and struggled over many inverted turns of phrase. This version tries to make accessible the core ideas, while preserving the exact paragraph structure of the original. I hope you find it of use.

BOOK I

Part 1

Rhetoric corresponds to Dialectic. Both concern matters common to all men, not specific sciences. Thus, everyone uses both; everyone attempts to discuss, maintain, defend, and attack statements. Ordinary people do this randomly or through practice. Since both ways work, we can handle the subject systematically. We can inquire why some succeed through practice and others spontaneously. Everyone agrees that such inquiry belongs to an art.

Current treatises on rhetoric cover only a small part of the art. Persuasion is the art's only true constituent; the rest is accessory. These writers ignore enthymemes, the substance of persuasion, and focus on non-essentials. Arousing prejudice, pity, and anger appeals to the judge, not the facts. If all trials followed the strict rules of well-governed states, these writers would be silenced. Ideally, laws should define rules, leaving little to the judge's discretion. This prevents perverting the judge with emotion—like warping a carpenter's rule. A litigant should only prove the facts: what happened or did not happen. The judge must decide on justice and importance, not take instructions from the litigants.

Well-drawn laws should define nearly every point, leaving little to the judges. First, finding a few sensible legislators is easier than finding many just judges. Second, laws result from long consideration, whereas court decisions are hasty. Third, the lawgiver judges prospectively and generally; the jury decides definite, present cases. Often, friendship, hatred, or self-interest obscures the jury’s vision. Therefore, the judge should decide as little as possible. He must decide only whether something happened, since the lawgiver cannot foresee the future. Consequently, writers who theorize about the 'introduction' or 'narration' ignore the art's essentials. They only teach how to manipulate the judge's mind, not how to use enthymemes.

Although political and forensic oratory share the same principles, and political oratory is nobler, authors focus solely on pleading in court. In political oratory, non-essentials matter less. It is less unscrupulous because it treats wider issues. The judge in a political debate decides his own interests. The speaker need only prove the facts. In forensic oratory, however, one must conciliate the listener. The judges, intent on their own satisfaction, often surrender to the disputants rather than judge them. Thus, many courts forbid irrelevant speaking; in public assemblies, the judges protect themselves.

Rhetoric, strictly speaking, concerns modes of persuasion. Persuasion is a form of demonstration; we are most persuaded when we consider a thing demonstrated. The rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, the most effective mode of persuasion. The enthymeme is a syllogism. Dialectic studies syllogisms. Therefore, he who understands the syllogism best will best understand the enthymeme, provided he knows its subject matter. The faculty that recognizes truth also recognizes probability. A man who guesses well at truth will guess well at probabilities.

We have shown that ordinary writers on rhetoric treat non-essentials and favor forensic oratory.

Rhetoric is useful for four reasons. First, truth and justice naturally prevail. If judgments fail, the speakers are to blame. Second, exact knowledge does not always convince an audience; we must use notions possessed by everybody. Third, we must be able to argue on opposite sides—not to deceive, but to understand the facts and confute unfair arguments. Only dialectic and rhetoric draw opposite conclusions impartially, though truth is easier to prove. Fourth, it is absurd to be ashamed of physical weakness but not of mental weakness. Rational speech is more distinctive of man than physical strength. If one argues that an unjust orator harms others, this applies to all good things except virtue—strength, health, wealth, and generalship can all be misused.

Rhetoric is not bound to a single subject; it is as universal as dialectic and clearly useful. Its function is not simply to persuade, but to discover the available means of persuasion in each case. In this, it resembles other arts. Medicine does not always heal, but it treats the patient as well as possible. Rhetoric discerns both the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as dialectic discerns the real and the apparent syllogism. A 'sophist' is defined by his moral purpose, not his faculty. In rhetoric, however, 'rhetorician' may describe either the speaker's skill or his purpose. In dialectic, a 'sophist' has a specific purpose; a 'dialectician' has a specific faculty.

Let us now account for the systematic principles of Rhetoric. We must define rhetoric anew.

Part 2

Rhetoric is the faculty of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion. No other art shares this function. Medicine instructs on health, geometry on magnitudes, arithmetic on numbers. Rhetoric, however, observes the means of persuasion on almost any subject. Therefore, it is not concerned with any special class of subjects.

Some modes of persuasion belong to the art of rhetoric; others do not. The latter—witnesses, evidence under torture, written contracts—exist beforehand. The former we construct ourselves. The one kind we use; the other we invent.

Spoken persuasion has three kinds: personal character, audience emotion, and proof. Character persuades when the speech makes the speaker seem credible. We believe good men more readily, especially where certainty is impossible. This persuasion should result from the speech, not from the speaker's prior reputation. Contrary to some writers, the speaker's character is his most effective means of persuasion. Secondly, persuasion comes through the hearers when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments vary with our feelings—pleasure or pain, friendliness or hostility. Present-day writers focus almost exclusively on this. We will discuss this later. Thirdly, persuasion comes through the speech itself when we prove a truth or an apparent truth.

To command these three means, a man must reason logically, understand human character and goodness, and understand the emotions—their nature, causes, and excitation. Thus, rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and ethical (or political) studies. Rhetoric often masquerades as political science, and its professors as experts, sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through ostentation. As stated, rhetoric is a branch of dialectic. Neither is a scientific study of a separate subject; both are faculties for providing arguments.

Regarding proof: as dialectic has induction and syllogism, so does rhetoric. The example is a rhetorical induction; the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism. Everyone uses either enthymemes or examples to prove a point. Since all proof rests on syllogism or induction (as shown in the Analytics), enthymemes must be syllogisms and examples inductions. The Topics explains the difference. Proving a proposition by similar cases is induction (dialectic) or example (rhetoric). Proving that a distinct proposition follows from certain truths is syllogism (dialectic) or enthymeme (rhetoric). Each type has advantages. Some styles rely on examples, others on enthymemes. Speeches with examples are persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more applause. We will discuss their sources and uses later. Now let us define the processes.

A statement is persuasive because it is self-evident or appears proved by other statements. In either case, it persuades someone. No art theorizes about individual cases. Medicine treats classes of patients, not just Socrates. Similarly, rhetoric deals with what seems probable to men of a given type, not just to an individual. Dialectic constructs syllogisms from materials calling for discussion; rhetoric draws from regular subjects of debate. Rhetoric deals with matters we deliberate on without systems, addressing listeners who cannot follow long chains of reasoning. We deliberate only on alternative possibilities. Nobody deliberates on the unchangeable.

We can form syllogisms from previous conclusions or from unproved but doubtful premises. The former are too long for untrained thinkers; the latter fail because their premises are not accepted.

Enthymemes and examples deal mainly with the contingent. The enthymeme consists of few propositions, fewer than a normal syllogism. If a proposition is familiar, omit it; the hearer supplies it. To show Dorieus won a contest with a crown as prize, simply say, "He won the Olympic games." Everyone knows the Olympic prize is a crown.

Few rhetorical syllogisms rely on necessary facts. We deliberate on our actions, which are contingent, not necessary. Conclusions about the usual or possible must come from similar premises. Thus, most enthymeme propositions are usually, not necessarily, true. Enthymemes use Probabilities and Signs. A Probability is a thing that usually happens—a contingent universal. Signs relate to the statement as particular to universal or universal to particular. The infallible sign is a "complete proof" (tekmerion); the fallible sign has no specific name. Infallible signs form syllogisms. If a sign is irrefutable, it is a complete proof. For instance, "He has a fever" is an infallible sign that he is ill. A fallible sign, like "He breathes fast" as a sign of fever, is refutable, for one may breathe fast without fever.

We have defined Probability, Sign, and complete proof. The Analytics explains why some form syllogisms and others do not.

The 'example' is a kind of induction. It relates part to part, or like to like. When a familiar statement supports a similar one, it is an example. For instance, to show Dionysius seeks a bodyguard to become a despot, we cite Peisistratus and Theagenes, who did the same. These instances support the general principle: a man asking for a bodyguard schemes to become a despot.

One distinction in enthymemes (and dialectical syllogisms) is often overlooked. Some belong to rhetoric or dialectic; others belong to specific arts. Missing this, people fail to see that handling a subject correctly leads them away from pure rhetoric. Dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms use universal Lines of Argument (topoi) applicable to many subjects (e.g., "the more or less"). Special Lines of Argument apply only to specific classes (e.g., ethics or physics). General Lines of Argument increase understanding of no particular class. Special Lines of Argument, however, approach a distinct science. Most enthymemes use special Lines of Argument. We must distinguish the special from the general. Special Lines of Argument are propositions peculiar to a class; general are common to all. We begin with the special. First, let us classify rhetoric.

Part 3

Rhetoric has three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners. The listener determines the speech's object. He is either a judge of things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides future events; a juryman, past events; an observer decides on the orator's skill. Thus, there are three divisions of oratory: political, forensic, and ceremonial.

Political speaking urges action or inaction. Private counsellors and public speakers always take one of these courses. Forensic speaking attacks or defends; litigants always do one or the other. Ceremonial oratory praises or censures. These three kinds refer to three different times. The political orator concerns himself with the future: he advises for or against things to be done. The litigant concerns himself with the past: he accuses or defends regarding things done. The ceremonial orator concerns himself properly with the present: he praises or blames existing conditions, though he may recall the past or guess at the future.

Each kind of rhetoric has a distinct end. The political orator aims at expediency or harmfulness; he urges acceptance because it does good, or rejection because it does harm. All other points—justice, honor—are subsidiary. Litigants aim at justice or injustice; they treat other points as subsidiary. Those who praise or attack aim at honor or disgrace, treating other considerations as subsidiary.

Speakers prove these are the ends by sometimes ignoring everything else. A litigant may admit the fact or the harm, but never the injustice; otherwise, there would be no trial. Political orators often concede anything except that their course is inexpedient. They may not care if enslaving innocent neighbors is unjust. Similarly, those who praise often make a man's neglect of his own interest a ground for praise. They praise Achilles for championing Patroclus at the cost of his life; to die was noble, though to live was expedient.

Evidently, the orator must command propositions on these three subjects. The propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every syllogism is composed of propositions; the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of these specific propositions.

Only possible actions can occur in the past or present. Things that have not occurred or will not occur cannot be done. Therefore, all speakers must have propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has happened or will happen. Further, all men attempt to prove that good or harm, honor or disgrace, justice or injustice, is great or small. Thus, we must command propositions about greatness and smallness, both universal and particular. We must be able to say which is the greater good or the greater injustice.

These are the subjects for which we must master relevant propositions. We must now discuss each class in turn: political, ceremonial, and legal oratory.

Part 4

We must first ascertain what subjects the political orator counsels on. He deals only with things that may or may not take place. No counsel is given on inevitable or impossible things. Nor do we deliberate on all possible things, such as natural or accidental events. We deliberate only on matters within our power—matters we can set going.

We will not attempt to classify these subjects accurately here. That belongs to political science, not rhetoric. Rhetoric combines logic and ethics; it resembles dialectic and sophistry. Treating rhetoric or dialectic as sciences of definite subjects destroys their nature. They are practical faculties. However, we will mention points of practical importance.

Political speakers deliberate primarily on five matters: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

Regarding Ways and Means, the speaker must know the country's revenue sources to add overlooked ones or increase defective ones. He must know all expenditures to abolish the superfluous and reduce the excessive. Men become richer by reducing expenditure as well as by increasing wealth. Experience in home affairs is insufficient; one must study the methods of other lands.

Regarding Peace and War, he must know his country's actual and potential military strength, and its history of wars. He must know the same about neighboring and likely hostile countries. This allows him to maintain peace with the stronger and make war on the weaker. He must compare military powers. He should study the wars of other countries, for similar causes produce similar results.

Regarding National Defence, he must know the defensive forces and the positions of forts. He must know the lie of the country. This allows him to increase or reduce garrisons and guard strategic points.

Regarding Food Supply, he must know the country's needs and its home production. He must know what to export and import to negotiate treaties. He must ensure his country offends neither stronger states nor useful trading partners.

Above all, he must understand legislation, for a country's welfare depends on its laws. He must know the different constitutions, their conditions for prosperity, and their causes of destruction. Constitutions are destroyed by being pushed too far or not far enough. Democracy turns into oligarchy if pushed to excess, just as an aquiline nose becomes deformed if too aquiline. The speaker should study his country's history and the constitutions of other nations. Books of travel help with laws and customs; historical researches help with politics. These, however, belong to political science.

These are the most important kinds of information for the political speaker. We will now state the premises for arguing for or against measures regarding these matters.

Part 5

Every man aims at a certain end: happiness and its constituents. This aim determines his choices. Advice concerns happiness—what creates it or destroys it. We ought to do what creates happiness and avoid what destroys it.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue, as independence, as the secure enjoyment of pleasure, or as a good condition of property and body with the power to guard and use them. Nearly everyone agrees happiness is one or more of these.

The parts of happiness are good birth, many and good friends, wealth, many and good children, a happy old age, and bodily excellences like health, beauty, strength, stature, and athletic skill. Also fame, honor, good luck, and virtue. A man with these internal (soul/body) and external (birth, friends, money, honor) goods is completely independent. He also needs resources and luck for security. Let us define these parts.

Good birth in a state means indigenous or ancient members, distinguished early leaders, and many admirable descendants.

Good birth in an individual means free citizenship on both sides, notable ancestors (for virtue or wealth), and many distinguished relatives.

"Many and good children" means, for a community, numerous young men of good body (stature, beauty, strength) and soul (temperance, courage). For an individual, it means numerous children with these qualities. This includes both male and female children. Women should have bodily beauty and stature, and soul-self-command and industry. Communities, like Sparta, where women are in a bad state, spoil half of human life.

Wealth consists of plenty of money, land, estates, implements, livestock, and slaves. These must be secure, gentlemanly, and useful. Productive property is useful; enjoyable property is gentlemanly. Security means the power to use it; ownership means the power to dispose of it (give or sell). Wealth lies in use, not ownership.

Fame is respect from everybody, or from the good or wise.

Honour is the token of a reputation for doing good. It is paid chiefly to benefactors, past or future. Doing good means preserving life, wealth, or other goods. Honour includes sacrifices, eulogies, privileges, land grants, front seats, state burial, statues, and public maintenance. Presents are also honours; they satisfy both the money-lover (as property) and the honour-lover (as a token).

Health is a condition allowing the use of the body while keeping free from disease. A "healthy" man like Herodicus, who abstains from everything to stay alive, is not truly healthy. Beauty varies with age. A young man's beauty is fitness for running and strength contests—pleasant to look at. An all-round athlete is most beautiful. A man in his prime is fit for war—pleasant yet formidable. An old man is strong enough for necessary exertion and free from deformity. Strength is the power to move others at will—by pulling, pushing, lifting, pinning, or gripping. Excellence in size means surpassing the average without losing speed. Athletic excellence combines size, strength, and swiftness. A runner moves legs fast and far; a wrestler grips; a boxer strikes. A pancratiast does both; an all-round athlete does all.

A happy old age comes slowly and painlessly. It requires bodily excellence and good luck. Even a strong man suffers if diseased or unlucky. Long life is independent of health or strength, but we will not discuss that here.

A friend tries to do what is good for you for your sake. He who has many such friends has "many friends"; if they are worthy, he has "good friends".

Good luck is the acquisition of good things due to luck. Some are artificial, some natural (like beauty and stature). Things that excite envy usually come from luck. Luck also causes unexpected good results: you are handsome when your brothers are ugly, or you find a treasure others missed, or a missile misses you.

We will define virtue when we discuss Eulogy.

Part 6

We now understand our aims in urging or deprecating proposals. The political orator aims at utility—what is useful to do. Utility is a good thing. Therefore, we must understand Goodness and Utility.

A good thing is chosen for its own sake, or for the sake of something else. It is sought by all rational beings, or prescribed by reason. It brings satisfaction and self-sufficiency. It produces or maintains these states, or prevents their opposites. One thing entails another simultaneously (as health entails life) or subsequently (as learning entails knowledge). Production occurs in three ways: as being healthy produces health, as food produces it, or as exercise usually does. Both acquiring good and removing bad are good. Acquiring a greater good for a lesser, or a lesser evil for a greater, is good. Virtues are good because they put us in good condition and produce good actions. Pleasure is good because all animals aim at it. Consequently, pleasant and beautiful things are good.

Here is a detailed list of good things. Happiness: desirable in itself and sufficient. Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence: excellences of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like: bodily excellences productive of pleasure and life. Wealth: the excellence of possession. Friends and friendship: desirable and productive. Honour and reputation: pleasant and productive. The faculty of speech and action. Good parts, strong memory, quick intuition. All sciences and arts. Life itself. Justice, as the cause of good to the community.

These are admittedly good. For disputed goods, argue thus: That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good of which the contrary helps our enemies; if cowardice helps them, courage helps us. Generally, the contrary of what our enemies desire is valuable. ("Surely would Priam exult.") However, sometimes our interest coincides with our enemies', as when a common evil unites us.

Further, moderation is good; excess is bad. That on which much labor or money is spent is good; it is an end reached through means. ("And for Priam... should they leave behind them a boast.") Also, the proverb about breaking the pitcher at the door applies.

What most people seek is good. "Most people" implies "everybody." What is praised is good. Even what enemies praise is good; if they admit it, it must be evident. (Corinthians felt insulted by Simonides: "Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.")

What discerning people favor is good—as Athena favored Odysseus. Generally, what men deliberately choose is good. This includes things bad for enemies or good for friends, provided they are practicable. "Practicable" means possible and easy. "Easy" means done quickly or without pain. Also good are things men wish for: either no evil or a balance of good. Things possessed exclusively, or appropriate to birth and capacity, are good. Things easily effected are good because they are practicable. Things that gratify friends or annoy enemies are good. Things chosen by those we admire, or for which we are fitted, are good. Things no worthless man can achieve bring greater praise. Finally, what we desire we consider pleasant and better. A man pursues what corresponds to his disposition: the victory-lover seeks victory; the money-lover, money. These are the sources of persuasion about Good and Utility.

Part 7

Since people often agree two things are useful but disagree on which is more so, we must discuss relative goodness and utility.

A thing that surpasses another contains it plus something more. "Greater" implies comparison with "less"; "great" and "small" imply comparison with the normal. The great surpasses the normal; the small is surpassed by it.

We define "good" as desirable for its own sake, sought by all, or chosen by the wise. It produces or preserves goods. The end is the good for the sake of which else is done. Therefore, a greater number of goods is better than a smaller number, if the smaller is included. The larger contains the smaller.

If the largest member of one class surpasses the largest of another, the first class surpasses the second. If the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, men are generally taller than women. Superiority of classes corresponds to the superiority of their largest members.

If one good always accompanies another, but not vice versa, the former is greater; it implies the use of the latter. Accompaniment is simultaneous (life with health), subsequent (knowledge with learning), or potential (cheating with sacrilege).

If two things surpass a third, the one surpassing it more is greater. What produces a greater good is itself greater. What is produced by a greater good is also greater. Health is better than pleasure because it is more wholesome.

What is desirable in itself (like bodily strength) is better than what is merely wholesome, which is not pursued for its own sake. An end is better than a means. What needs less is more self-sufficing and therefore better. What cannot exist without a second, while the second can exist without it, is inferior to the second.

A beginning or cause is a greater good than what is not. Without a cause, nothing exists. Where two causes produce consequences, the cause with more important consequences is more important. Conversely, the cause of more important consequences is itself more important. Thus, one can argue a thing is important because it is a beginning, or because it is an end. Leodamas accused Callistratus of being more guilty for prompting the deed, but Chabrias for doing it.

What is rare is better than what is plentiful. Gold is better than iron, though less useful, because it is harder to get. Conversely, the plentiful is better because we can use it more often. "The best of things is water." Generally, the hard is better than the easy because it is rarer; yet the easy is better because it is as we wish.

That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, or whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness is better than the mere absence of badness. Good things have noble functions; bad things have base ones. Superiority in desirable qualities is better: keen sight is better than keen smell. Unusually great love of friends is nobler than unusually great love of money.

If it is nobler to desire a thing, that thing is nobler. The importance of the object corresponds to the importance of the instinct. If a science is valuable, so is its object.

What the wise or the majority judge good must be so. Good is what understanding chooses; therefore, what understanding declares better is better. What better men choose is better. Courage is better than strength. Suffering wrong is better than doing wrong, for the just man chooses it.

The pleasanter thing is better, for all pursue pleasure. A pleasure unmixed with pain, or more lasting, is greater. The nobler thing is better. What we desire earnestly for ourselves or friends is a greater good; what we least desire is a greater evil. Lasting and secure things are better.

Co-ordinate terms follow the same rule. If "brave" is better than "temperate," then "bravery" is better than "temperance." What all choose is better than what some choose. What competitors or enemies consider better is better; their judgment is impartial.

Sometimes we argue that what all share is better (it is a dishonour not to share); other times, what few share is better (it is rare). Praiseworthy things are better. Things with heavy penalties for absence are better.

Dividing things into parts makes them seem better; they seem to surpass more things. Homer lists the horrors of a captured city to rouse Meleager. Piling up facts produces a similar effect.

Since hard or rare things are better, superiority due to season, age, or place is valuable. Accomplishing something beyond one's natural power or years is noble. What is natural is better than what is acquired.

The best part of a good thing is particularly good. Pericles called the loss of young men "the spring taken out of the year." Things useful in pressing need (old age, sickness) are better. What leads directly to the end is better. What is possible is better than what is impossible. What is at the end of life is better.

Reality is better than appearance. We define appearance as what a man would not choose if it remained unknown. Thus, receiving benefits is better than conferring them, for one would choose to receive even secretly. Being is better than seeming. Men say justice is of small value because it is better to seem just than to be just; not so with health.

What serves many purposes (life, pleasure, noble conduct) is better. Hence wealth and health are highly valued. What brings pleasure with less pain is better. What makes a better whole when added to a third thing is better. Visible possessions are better because they seem real. What is dearly prized is better; blinding a one-eyed man is worse than half-blinding a two-eyed man.

We have now set forth the grounds for arguing for or against a proposal.

Part 8

To persuade audiences on public affairs, one must understand the forms of government—their customs, institutions, and interests. Men are persuaded by their interests, which lie in maintaining the established order. The supreme authority gives decisions; this authority varies with the government. There are four forms: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge rests with the governing power of each.

In a democracy, citizens distribute offices by lot. In an oligarchy, they require a property qualification. In an aristocracy, they require education—specifically, education laid down by law. Those loyal to national institutions hold office; they are considered "the best men," hence the name "aristocracy." Monarchy is rule by one man. Kingship is limited by conditions; tyranny is unlimited.

We must notice the ends of each government, for people choose actions that lead to their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. We must distinguish the customs and interests that realize these ideals. Rhetorical persuasion relies on ethical as well as demonstrative argument; a speaker convinces us if we believe he possesses goodness or goodwill. Similarly, we must know the moral qualities characteristic of each government, for the character of the government provides our most effective means of persuasion. We learn these qualities from their deliberate acts of choice, which are determined by their ends.

We have considered the objects of political persuasion and the grounds for arguing utility. We have also briefly considered how to learn the moral qualities and institutions of the various governments. The Politics gives a detailed account.

Part 9

We must now consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, the objects of praise and blame. This will also help us make our own characters appear credible—our second method of persuasion. We make others trust our goodness in the same way we make them trust others'. Praise may be serious or frivolous, addressing humans, gods, inanimate things, or animals.

The Noble is both desirable for its own sake and praiseworthy, or both good and pleasant because good. If this is true, virtue is noble, being good and praiseworthy. Virtue is a faculty of providing and preserving good, or of conferring great benefits on all occasions. Its forms are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. The highest virtues are those most useful to others, like justice and courage. Liberality is useful because liberal men spend rather than fight for money. Justice lets men enjoy their own property legally; injustice does the opposite. Courage disposes men to noble deeds in danger; cowardice does the opposite. Temperance disposes men to obey the law regarding physical pleasures; incontinence does the opposite. Liberality spends for others; illiberality does not. Magnanimity does good on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness]. Magnificence produces greatness in spending; its opposites are smallness of spirit and meanness. Prudence is the understanding that decides wisely about happiness and goods.

This suffices for virtue and vice. Things productive of virtue are noble, as are the effects and signs of virtue. Deeds of courage are noble, as are just actions (though receiving justice is not always noble; being punished justly is shameful). Actions rewarded by honor, or done for others, or done for one's country, are noble. Actions good in themselves, not just for the individual, are noble. Noble actions include those enjoyed after death, those done for others, benefits to others, services to benefactors, and good deeds generally.

The opposites of shameful things are noble. Men are ashamed of saying or doing shameful things. As Sappho told Alcaeus: "If your wish were noble, shame would not weigh on your eyelids."

Things men strive for without fear are noble; they lead to fame. Qualities of naturally finer beings are noble (a man's vs. a woman's). Qualities giving pleasure to others are noble (justice). Avenging oneself is noble, for requital is just. Not surrendering is noble (courage). Victory and honor are noble, proving superiority. Memorable things are noble, especially if they last after death, are always honored, or are exceptional. Possessions bringing no profit are noble, fitting a gentleman. Distinctive customs, like long hair in Sparta, are noble. Not practicing a sordid craft is noble for a free man.

To praise or blame, identify a man's actual qualities with closely allied virtues or vices. Call the cautious man cold-blooded, the stupid man honest. Idealize the passionate man as "outspoken," the arrogant as "impressive." Call rashness courage, and extravagance generosity. This appeals to the audience and allows misleading inferences from motive: if a man risks danger needlessly, he will surely do so in a noble cause.

Consider the audience. As Socrates said, praising Athenians to Athenians is easy. If the audience esteems a quality, attribute it to your hero. Represent everything esteemed as noble.

Appropriate actions are noble—those worthy of ancestors or past career. Adding to existing honor is noble. Even inappropriate actions are noble if they surpass expectation—if an average man becomes a hero in adversity, or a successful man becomes easier to get on with. Compare Iphicrates: "Think what I was and what I am."

Since we praise intentional actions, prove the hero's deeds were intentional. Assert that coincidences were intended. Show a pattern of good actions to prove intent and character.

Praise expresses the eminence of good qualities. Encomium refers to actual deeds. Accessories like birth and education help credibility. We bestow encomiums for deeds. Yet deeds evidence character; we praise a man if we believe he would do the deed. Calling a man blest or happy includes praise and encomium, as goodness is part of happiness.

Praise is akin to urging action. Suggestions for action become encomiums when rephrased. "A man should be proud of what he owes to himself" becomes "He is proud of what he owes to himself." To praise, think what you would urge; to urge, think what you would praise.

To heighten praise, point out uniqueness, primacy, or superiority. Mention the season and occasion. If he achieved success often, emphasize it to credit him, not luck. Mention if he inspired new observances (like Hippolochus or Harmodius). Censure bad men for the opposite.

If you lack material, compare him with others, especially famous men. Surpassing the great is noble. If not famous men, compare him with ordinary people; superiority reveals excellence. Heightening effect suits declamations (epideictic); examples suit deliberative; enthymemes suit forensic speeches.

These are the lines for speeches of praise or blame. We know the materials for encomiums and censures. Censure simply reverses the grounds of praise.

Part 10

We must now discuss Accusation and Defence, and the ingredients of their syllogisms. We must ascertain three things: the incentives to wrongdoing, the state of mind of wrongdoers, and the kind of persons wronged. We will deal with these in order, after defining 'wrongdoing'.

'Wrongdoing' is injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. Law is either special (written law of a community) or general (universal unwritten principles). Voluntary acts are done consciously and without constraint. All deliberate acts are conscious. The causes of deliberate, illegal harm are vice and lack of self-control. A man's wrongs correspond to his bad qualities. The mean man wrongs others for money; the profligate, for pleasure; the effeminate, for comfort; the coward, from terror. The ambitious man seeks honor; the quick-tempered, anger; the victory-lover, victory; the embittered, revenge; the stupid, from misguided notions; the shameless, from indifference.

We have partly discussed this under virtues and will discuss it further under emotions. Now let us consider motives and victims.

First, what do people try to get or avoid when wronging others? The prosecutor must consider which inducements affect his adversary; the defendant, which do not. Every action is due either to the person himself or not. Actions not due to himself are due to chance, necessity (compulsion), or nature. Actions due to himself are due to habit or craving (rational or irrational). Rational craving is a wish for good. Irrational craving is anger or appetite.

Thus, every action springs from one of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. Distinctions based on age or condition are superfluous. Young men act from anger or appetite, not youth. Poor men crave money from appetite, not poverty. Just and unjust men act from reasoning or emotion. However, certain actions and people usually go together. Accessory qualities like wealth or luck are important.

Chance events have no determined cause, no purpose, and no regularity. Natural events have a fixed internal cause and occur uniformly. Compelled events happen contrary to desire, through the doer's agency. Habitual acts are done from frequent repetition. Reasoned acts aim at a useful end (real or apparent). Anger causes acts of revenge. Punishment aims at the offender's good; revenge, at the punisher's satisfaction. Appetite causes all acts that appear pleasant. Habit also makes things pleasant.

To sum up: all voluntary actions either are or seem good or pleasant. I count escape from evil as a good, and escape from pain as a pleasure. We must therefore ascertain what is useful and what is pleasant. We have discussed the useful; now for the pleasant.

Part 11

Pleasure is a movement bringing the soul consciously into its normal state; pain is the opposite. Thus, what produces this condition is pleasant; what destroys it is painful. Moving toward a natural state is pleasant, especially when the process completes recovery. Habits are pleasant because the habitual becomes natural; the often is akin to the always.

What is unforced is pleasant. Force is unnatural and painful; "All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul." Acts of concentration and effort are painful unless habitual. Ease, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep are pleasant because they are uncompelled. Satisfied desires are pleasant. Irrational desires (thirst, hunger, sex) originate in the body. Rational desires arise from opinion; we desire what we are told is good.

Pleasure is conscious emotion. Imagination is feeble sensation; memory and expectation retain images. Thus, memory and expectation are accompanied by sensation and pleasure. We enjoy present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Remembering is pleasant, even of past pains, if the results were noble. "Sweet 'tis when rescued to remember pain." Being free from evil is pleasant.

Expecting delight or benefit is pleasant. Generally, what delights in the present delights in memory or expectation. Even anger is pleasant—"sweeter than honeycomb"—because we enjoy the prospect of vengeance. We do not get angry where vengeance is impossible.

Most appetites involve pleasure in memory or expectation. Fever patients enjoy remembering drinks. Lovers enjoy talking or writing about the beloved, recalling him to the imagination. Love begins when one feels pain at absence and pleasure in memory. Even mourning has pleasure; we grieve the loss but enjoy remembering the person. "He spake, and in each man's heart he awakened the love of lament."

Revenge is pleasant. Failing to get it is painful; expecting it is pleasant. Victory is pleasant to everyone, not just bad losers; the winner sees himself as a champion. Thus, combative sports, games, and hunting are pleasant. Where there is competition, there is victory. Debating is pleasant to those with capacity for it.

Honour and good repute are highly pleasant. They make a man see himself as fine, especially when credited by good judges—neighbors, associates, contemporaries, the sensible. We value honour from those we esteem, not from children or animals.

Friends are pleasant. Loving is pleasant (like loving wine). Being loved is pleasant; it confirms one's goodness. To be admired is pleasant for the honour. Flattery is pleasant because the flatterer seems to admire and like us.

Repetition is pleasant (habit). Change is also pleasant (nature). Invariable repetition causes excess. "Change is in all things sweet." Rare things are pleasant. Learning and wondering are pleasant; wondering implies a desire to learn. Imitation (painting, sculpture, poetry) is pleasant even if the object is unpleasant; we learn by inferring "That is so-and-so." Dramatic turns and escapes are pleasant because they are wonderful.

Kinship is pleasant. Like delights like ("jackdaw to jackdaw"). Since every man is akin to himself, self-love is natural. We love our own deeds, words, and children. Completing what is defective is pleasant; the result becomes our own work. Power and wisdom are pleasant. Disparaging neighbors is pleasant to the ambitious. Doing what one does best is pleasant. "To that he bends himself... wherein he is indeed the best part of himself." Amusement, relaxation, and laughter are pleasant; hence the ludicrous is pleasant. We discuss this in the Poetics.

So much for pleasant things. Their opposites are unpleasant.

Part 12

These are the motives for wrongdoing. We must next consider the wrongdoer's state of mind and the persons he wrongs.

Wrongdoers must believe they can do the deed, either secretly or with impunity, or that the gain outweighs the punishment. We will discuss apparent possibility later. Men think they can wrong others with impunity if they possess eloquence, practical ability, legal experience, many friends, or money. They feel safest if they have these advantages personally; if not, they rely on friends or partners. They also feel safe if they are on good terms with their victims or the judges. Victims on good terms are off their guard and settle easily; judges favor friends and impose light sentences.

They avoid detection if their appearance contradicts the charge: a weakling is unlikely to be charged with assault, or an ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are easy because nobody expects them and therefore nobody guards against them. The same applies to terrible crimes; nobody guards against a disease nobody has ever had.

You feel safe if you have no enemies or many. If none, you are unwatched; if many, people think you would not risk it, and you can plead that you never would have. You may also trust to the way or place of the crime, or to means of disposal.

You may feel you can postpone a trial, corrupt judges, or avoid paying damages. You may have nothing to lose. You may see the gain as great, certain, and immediate, and the penalty as small, uncertain, or distant. Or the gain may outweigh any retribution, as with despotic power. You may profit solidly while suffering only bad names. Conversely, the crime may bring credit (avenging a parent) while the penalty is merely a fine.

People are led by either motive, but not by both; they affect opposite characters. You may be encouraged by past escapes or by past failures (refusing to give up). Weak-willed persons prefer immediate pleasure and later pain; sensible persons prefer immediate pain and later profit. You may make the crime appear due to chance, necessity, or habit—as if you failed to do right rather than did wrong. You may trust to equitable judgment, or be stimulated by want (of necessaries or luxuries). A good reputation saves you from suspicion; a bad one means nothing can make it worse.

Such are the wrongdoer's states of mind. Now for the victims and the methods. People wrong those who have what they want. Victims may be near (quick profit) or far (slow vengeance). They may be trustful (easy to elude), easy-going (too lazy to prosecute), sensitive (avoiding money fights), or already wronged and silent (the "Mysian prey"). They may be those never wronged (unguarded) or often wronged (expecting no more).

They wrong those with attacked characters, who fear judges. They wrong those they can pretend treated them badly; wickedness needs only a pretext. They wrong enemies because it is pleasant, and friends because it is easy. They wrong the friendless and the ineloquent. They wrong foreigners and small farmers, who settle for a trifle. They wrong those who have wronged others; this feels like no wrong at all.

They wrong those who have done or intended wrong, for it seems fine to wrong them. They wrong those to gratify friends, masters, or admirers. They wrong those from whom they expect equitable treatment. They wrong those against whom they have a grievance (like Callippus to Dion). They wrong those about to be wronged by others, to forestall them (like Aenesidemus and Gelon). They wrong others to do many righteous acts, curing the harm easily (as Jason said).

They commit common wrongs, expecting forgiveness. They commit wrongs easily kept dark—involving consumables, changeables, or portables. They commit wrongs the victim is ashamed to speak of (outrages to women or self). They commit trifling wrongs that appear litigious to prosecute.

This covers the circumstances, nature, victims, and reasons of wrongdoing.

Part 13

We must classify just and unjust actions. They are defined by two kinds of law and two classes of persons. Law is particular or universal. Particular law is what a community lays down for itself, written or unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. There is a natural justice binding on all men, even without covenant. Sophocles' Antigone appeals to this when she calls burying Polyneices just by nature: "Not of to-day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal..." Empedocles says killing no living creature is an all-embracing law.

Actions affect either the community or a member of it. Thus, we can do right or wrong toward a definite person or toward the community. Adultery and assault wrong a person; draft evasion wrongs the community.

Thus, unjust actions affect either the community or an individual. "Being wronged" implies intentional injury. To be wronged, a man must suffer actual harm against his will. The forms of harm correspond to goods and evils. Every accusation concerns an action affecting the community or an individual. The doer must either intend the action or not. Intentional acts spring from deliberate choice or passion.

Often a man admits the act but denies the label. He took a thing, but did not steal it; struck first, but committed no outrage. We must distinguish theft, outrage, and adultery from simple acts. Deliberate purpose constitutes criminal guilt. A blow is outrage only if meant to insult. Taking is theft only if meant to injure the owner and keep the object.

We have discussed written ordinances. Unwritten law has two varieties. First, conduct springing from exceptional goodness or badness, bringing honor or censure (e.g., gratitude, helping friends). Second, equity. Equity makes up for defects in written law. It is just, but goes beyond the written law. Legislators sometimes omit it inadvertently, or because they cannot define things exactly. They must legislate generally, though the rule only holds usually. If a precise statement is impossible, the law uses wide terms. Thus, a man lifting a finger-ring to strike is guilty by the letter, but innocent by equity.

Equity applies to forgivable actions. It distinguishes errors and misfortunes from crimes. A misfortune has unexpected results not due to vice. An error has expected results not due to vice. A crime has expected results due to vice. Equity bids us be merciful to human weakness; to look to the legislator's meaning, not his words; to the intention, not the act; to the whole story, not the detail; to the man's past, not his present. It bids us remember benefits received; to be patient when wronged; to prefer arbitration to litigation, for the arbitrator looks to equity, the judge to law.

This suffices for equity.

Part 14

The worse act springs from the worse disposition. Thus, trifling acts may be the worst. Callistratus charged Melanopus with cheating temple-builders of three half-obols; the potential crime was great. Conversely, the worse act is sometimes the one causing greater harm.

An act is worse if:

1. No punishment is adequate.
2. The harm is incurable.
3. The victim cannot obtain legal redress.
4. The victim punished himself; the doer deserves a worse penalty. (Sophocles argued this regarding Euctemon's suicide.)
5. The doer was the first or only one to commit it.
6. It is not his first serious offence.
7. It led to new laws or prisons.
8. It was brutal or deliberate.
9. It excites terror rather than pity.

Rhetorically, we may argue that the accused broke many obligations—oaths, promises, pledges, rights. Or that he committed the crime in a place of punishment (a law court), showing he would commit it anywhere.

The deed is worse if it involves special shame, or wrongs benefactors (harming those he should help). It is worse if it breaks unwritten laws, for the better man is just voluntarily, not by force. Conversely, it may be worse if it breaks written laws, for he who defies terrible penalties will not hesitate where there are none.

Part 15

We must cursorily view the five "non-technical" means of persuasion: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths.

First, laws. If the written law opposes our case, appeal to the universal law and equity. Argue that "honest opinion" means not following the written law blindly. Urge that equity and universal law are changeless and natural, unlike written laws (as Antigone argued). Argue that true justice is profitable; sham justice (bad law) is not. Law is like silver; judges must assay it. The better man follows unwritten law. Or argue the law contradicts another law or itself. Or interpret ambiguity in favor of justice. Or argue the law's occasion has passed.

If the written law supports us, argue that "honest opinion" prevents perjury, not lawlessness. No one chooses absolute good, but good for himself. Not using laws is having no laws. It does not pay to be cleverer than the doctor or the laws.

Witnesses are ancient (poets, notables) or recent (risk-sharers). Athenians appealed to Homer; Themistocles to an oracle. Proverbs are evidence. Recent witnesses are well-known people whose opinions support us. Witnesses sharing the risk validly attest facts, not quality. For quality, detached persons are trustworthy. Ancient witnesses are most trustworthy, being incorruptible.

If you have no witnesses, argue that judges must decide by probabilities, which cannot be bribed or perjure themselves. If you have witnesses, argue that probabilities cannot be cross-examined and that witnesses make the case clearer.

Evidence may refer to us or our opponent, to fact or character. We can always find evidence of our worth or our opponent's worthlessness. Arguments about a witness's friendship, enmity, or reputation follow general lines.

Confirm or upset contracts like witnesses. If the contract supports us, insist on its importance. A contract is a special law; disregarding it undermines the law and human intercourse. If it opposes us, use arguments against bad laws. The judge seeks justice, not just legality. Fraud or force invalidates a contract. Check if it contravenes laws or other contracts, or if it harms the judges' interests.

Torture is evidence by compulsion. If it helps us, argue it is infallible. If it hurts us, argue that people lie under torture to end the pain, often falsely accusing. Quote familiar cases.

Oaths offer four possibilities: offer and accept, neither, or one without the other.

If you refuse to offer an oath, argue that men perjure themselves. You trust the judges more than your opponent.

If you refuse to accept an oath, argue that an oath is always paid for. If you were a rascal, you would swear for gain; your refusal shows high principle. "Tis not fair that he who fears not God should challenge him who doth."

If you accept an oath, argue you trust yourself, not your opponent. It is fair for the impious to offer and the pious to accept. It is monstrous to refuse an oath when you ask judges to swear.

If you offer an oath, argue that piety leaves the issue to the gods. Your opponent should not want other judges than himself.

Combine these arguments for mixed cases.

If you have sworn a contradictory oath, argue it is not perjury, for crime requires voluntary intent. Perjury depends on intention, not words. If your opponent has done so, argue he is an enemy of society who defies the laws.

So much for non-technical persuasion.

BOOK II

Part 1

We have considered the materials for political, ceremonial, and forensic oratory—the received opinions on which we base our arguments.

Since rhetoric exists to affect decisions, the orator must not only demonstrate his argument but also present his character rightly and put the audience into the right frame of mind. Character matters most in politics; emotion, in lawsuits. Friendly hearers judge differently from hostile ones. To the friendly, the accused seems innocent; to the hostile, guilty. Eager hearers expect success; indifferent ones do not.

Three things inspire confidence in the orator's character: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements or bad advice spring from the lack of these. Men may lack sense; or they may have sense but lack integrity, concealing their true thoughts; or they may have both but lack goodwill, failing to recommend the best course. These are the only causes. Therefore, he who appears to possess all three inspires trust. We have analyzed good sense and character in our discussion of virtues. We must now discuss goodwill and friendliness under the head of emotions.

Emotions are feelings that change men so as to affect their judgments, attended by pain or pleasure. Examples are anger, pity, and fear. We must analyze each under three heads: the state of mind, the people causing it, and the grounds. Unless we know all three, we cannot arouse emotion. Let us proceed.

Part 2

Anger is an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification toward oneself or one's friends. It is always felt toward a particular individual, not "man" in general. It arises because the other has done or intended something to him or his friends. It is always attended by pleasure—the expectation of revenge. The angry man aims at what he can attain, and the belief in attainment is pleasant. "Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb..." The thoughts dwell on the act of vengeance, causing pleasure like dreams.

Slighting is the active opinion that something is unimportant. We consider bad and good things important; we slight what has no such tendency. There are three kinds of slighting: contempt, spite, and insolence. Contempt slights the unimportant. Spite thwarts another's wishes, not for gain but to prevent his gain. Spite arises because you do not fear him (or you would not slight him) nor respect him (or you would want his friendship). Insolence shames the victim, not for gain, but for pleasure. The insolent man feels superior. Youth and rich men are insolent. Robbing people of honour is a form of insolence. Achilles says: "He hath taken my prize... and hath done me dishonour." A man expects respect from inferiors in birth, capacity, or goodness. "Great is the wrath of kings..." He also expects it from those he has treated well.

Evidently, we get angry when we are in pain. In this condition, we always aim at something. If anyone opposes us—preventing us from drinking when thirsty—we get angry. Sickness, poverty, love, thirst, or any unsatisfied desire makes us prone to anger, especially against those who slight our distress. The sick man is angered by disregard of his illness; the lover, by disregard of his love. Each man's emotion predisposes him to his particular anger. We are also angered by unexpected results; unexpected evil is especially painful.

These are the frames of mind. We get angry with those who laugh or mock at us (insolence). With those who inflict insolent injuries (neither retaliatory nor profitable). With those who despise what we care about (philosophy, appearance), especially if we suspect we lack the quality. With friends who treat us badly or fail to return kindnesses. With inferiors who oppose us (they seem to despise us). We get angry with men of no account if they slight us. We get angry with friends who do not speak well of us, or fail to perceive our needs (like Plexippus with Meleager); this shows negligence. We get angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or are indifferent to our pain (bringers of bad news). With those who listen to stories about our weaknesses. With those who slight us before rivals, admirers, or those we revere. With those who slight those we must champion (parents, children). With those who do not return a favor. With those who reply with levity to seriousness. With those who treat us less well than others. With those who forget our names; forgetfulness shows negligence, and negligence is slighting.

We have set forth the persons, frame of mind, and reasons for anger. The orator must bring his hearers into a frame of mind disposed to anger, and show his adversaries as deserving it.

Part 3

Calmness is the settling down of anger. We feel calm toward those who do not slight us, or do so involuntarily, or intended the opposite. We feel calm toward those who treat themselves as they treated us (no one slights himself). We feel calm toward those who admit their fault and regret it; we accept their grief as satisfaction. We punish servants who deny their fault, but forgive those who admit it. Denial is shameless; admission is humble. We feel calm toward those who humble themselves, for they admit inferiority and fear, and fear precludes slighting. Even dogs do not bite those who sit down. We feel calm toward those serious when we are serious; toward benefactors; toward suppliants. We feel calm toward those who do not insult worthy people. We are not angry with those we fear or respect. We are not angry with those who acted from anger, for they did not slight us (slighting is painless, anger is painful).

People are calm when amused, laughing, feasting, prosperous, or satisfied—when free from pain. Time also calms anger. Vengeance on one person calms anger against another. Philocrates said, "I will defend myself when I see someone else calumniated." The people acquitted Ergophilus because they had just condemned Callisthenes. Men become calm if the offender is convicted or suffers worse than they would have inflicted; they feel avenged. They become calm if they feel they are in the wrong and suffer justly. We should inflict a preliminary punishment in words to satisfy this feeling. We become calm if the offender will not know we punished him. Anger requires individual recognition. Odysseus insisted the Cyclops know who blinded him. We cease to be angry with the dead, who feel no pain. As Apollo said of Achilles abusing Hector: "For behold in his fury he doeth despite to the senseless clay."

To calm others, use these arguments. Put the hearers into the right frame of mind. Represent those they are angry with as formidable, worthy of reverence, benefactors, involuntary agents, or deeply distressed.

Part 4

Let us now discuss Friendship and Enmity. We define friendly feeling as wishing for another what you believe to be good, for his sake, and trying to bring it about. A friend feels this and excites it in return. A friend shares your pleasure in good and your pain in unpleasantness, for your sake. This shared feeling is the token of good wishes; we are glad when we get what we wish, and pained when we do not.

Friends share the same views on good and evil. They are friendly or unfriendly to the same people. Thus, they wish for each other what they wish for themselves. We feel friendly to benefactors (of ourselves or those we care for), provided the kindness was for our sake. We like those who wish to treat us well. We like our friends' friends and those who like whom we like. We like those who dislike whom we dislike; they share our view of good, so they wish us good.

We like those willing to treat us well in money or safety—the liberal, brave, and just. The just do not live on others; they work, like farmers. We like temperate men because they are not unjust. We like those who mind their own business. We like those who wish to be our friends, if they are morally good or well thought of. We like those pleasant to live with: the good-tempered, the uncritical, the unquarrelsome (quarrelers seem to wish the opposite of our wishes), and those who can make and take a joke.

We like those who praise our good qualities, especially those we doubt we possess. We like the cleanly. We like those who do not reproach us or nurse grudges, but are ready to make up. We like those who are not evil speakers, who see only our good points. We like those who do not thwart us when angry or earnest. We like those who admire us, believe in our goodness, or enjoy our company, especially regarding qualities we wish admired. We like those like ourselves in character and occupation, provided they do not compete with us ("Potter to potter... begrudge their reward").

We like those who desire what we desire, if we can share it; otherwise, trouble arises. We like those before whom we can do wrong without blushing (respecting their opinion but trusting them), and those before whom we would be ashamed to do wrong. We like rivals we wish to envy us without ill-feeling. We like those we help, if we do not suffer heavily. We like those faithful in our absence; hence we love those faithful to the dead. We like those who do not desert friends in trouble. We like those honest with us about their own weaknesses. We like those who do not frighten us.

Friendship has forms like comradeship, intimacy, and kinship.

Causes of friendship are doing kindnesses, doing them unasked, and not proclaiming them.

Enmity and Hatred are opposite to friendship. Enmity springs from anger, spite, or calumny. Anger arises from offences against oneself; enmity may arise from character alone. We hate thieves and informers generally. Anger is cured by time; hatred is not. Anger aims at pain; hatred, at harm. The angry man wants his victim to feel; the hater does not care. Pain is felt; the greatest evils (injustice, folly) are not. Anger involves pain; hatred does not. The angry man may pity; the hater never pities, for he wishes the object's destruction.

Thus we can prove people friends or enemies, or refute such claims, or attribute actions to anger or hatred as preferred.

Part 5

Let us discuss Fear. Fear is a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future. We fear only imminent, great pains or losses, not remote ones (like death) or painless evils (like stupidity).

Fear is caused by whatever has the power to destroy or greatly harm us. Indications of such things are terrible, implying danger. We fear the enmity and anger of the powerful, for they are ready to act. We fear injustice possessed of power. We fear outraged virtue possessing power (it wishes to retaliate). We fear those who fear us (they are ready to strike). We fear being at another's mercy, especially if we have done something horrible; accomplices may betray us. We fear those who can wrong us, for men usually wrong others when they can. We fear those we have wronged, for they watch for opportunity. We fear powerful wrongdoers, for they fear retaliation. We fear rivals. We fear those feared by stronger people, and those who have destroyed stronger people. We fear those attacking the weak; they will soon be stronger.

We fear the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous enemy more than the outspoken one; we never know when he will strike. Terrible things are worse if mistakes are irretrievable or remediable only by enemies. Things we cannot help are terrible. Generally, we fear what we pity in others.

To feel fear, we must believe something destructive is likely to happen to us, from particular persons, at a particular time. Those in great prosperity (insolent, reckless) do not fear. Those who have experienced every horror (callous) do not fear; fear requires some faint hope of escape. Fear sets us thinking what to do; hopelessness does not.

Therefore, the orator must make the audience feel they are in danger. He must show that stronger people have suffered, and that people like themselves are suffering unexpectedly.

Confidence is the opposite of fear. It is the expectation of safety and the absence of terror. We feel confident if we can cure or prevent trouble; if we have neither wronged nor been wronged; if we have no strong rivals, or if our strong rivals are friends. We feel confident if our interest aligns with the stronger or more numerous party.

We feel confident if we have often succeeded or escaped danger. Men face danger calmly from inexperience or from possession of means. We feel confident if our equals or inferiors are not afraid, or if we have conquered our superiors. We feel confident if we possess more formidable advantages (wealth, strength, territory) than our rivals. We feel confident if we have wronged no one, or at least not the formidable. We feel confident if our relations with the gods are satisfactory; anger makes us confident because we believe the gods side with the wronged. We feel confident if we believe we cannot fail.

Part 6

Shame is pain or disturbance regarding bad things, present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve discredit. Shamelessness is indifference to these things. We feel shame at things disgraceful to ourselves or those we care for.

Disgraceful things include those due to vice: throwing away a shield (cowardice); wronging people about money (injustice); forbidden intercourse (licentiousness); making petty profit from the poor or dead (greed); giving little help or accepting help from the poor; begging like a loan or asking a return like a beggar; praising to beg; persisting after failure (meanness). Flattery is disgraceful: praising a man to his face, glozing his weaknesses. Effeminacy is disgraceful: unable to endure what the old or delicate endure. Accepting benefits often and abusing the giver is mean. Boastfulness is talking incessantly of oneself.

We feel shame at lacking honourable things shared by our equals (race, country, family, age). It is worse if the lack is our own fault. We feel shame at suffering dishonourable acts, like submitting to outrage. Yielding to lust is shameful, willing or unwilling; unresisting submission shows unmanliness.

We feel shame before those whose opinion matters: those we admire, those who admire us, those we wish to admire us, rivals, and those whose opinion we respect (the sensible, elders, educated). We feel more shame if the act is open; "shame dwells in the eyes." We feel shame before those always present or observant; before those innocent of the same fault (their opinion is opposite); before those hard on others; before those who tell tales (evil-speakers, satirists, wronged persons). We feel shame before those who have not seen us come to grief, especially those just beginning to be friends. We are ashamed of the evidences of guilt as well as the acts. We are ashamed before those who will tell others. We are not ashamed before those we despise (children, animals). We are ashamed of genuine faults before intimates, and conventional ones before strangers.

We feel shame when the people mentioned are looking on or near. We do not wish to be seen in misfortune by those who once envied us. We feel shame at bringing dishonour on our own or our ancestors' exploits. We feel shame before those who model themselves on us. We feel more shame if we must live continually with those who know our disgrace. Antiphon asked those covering their faces before execution: "Why cover your faces? Is it lest some of these spectators should see you to-morrow?"

Shamelessness is the opposite.

Part 7

Kindness is helpfulness toward someone in need, not for return or for the helper's advantage, but for that of the person helped. Kindness is great if the need is great (important, hard to get, or at a crisis), or if the helper is the only, first, or chief one to help. Needs arise from natural cravings accompanied by pain, such as appetites in danger and pain. Hence small help in great need (poverty, banishment) is real kindness.

We must argue that the persons helped are in such need and the helpers meet it. To eliminate the idea of kindness, argue that the helpers acted for their own interest, or accidentally, or under compulsion. Or that they were merely returning a favor; a return is not a kindness. Consider all categories: substance, magnitude, quality, time, place. Point out if they refused a smaller service before, or helped enemies more. Or if the thing given was worthless and they knew it; no one needs the worthless.

Part 8

Pity is a feeling of pain at the sight of destructive or painful evil befalling one who does not deserve it, which we might expect to befall ourselves or a friend soon. To feel pity, we must be capable of supposing evil may happen to us. Those completely ruined do not feel it (they have nothing worse to fear); nor do those who think themselves immensely fortunate (they think they are safe).

Those who fear evil are: those who have escaped it; the elderly (from experience); the weak (cowards); the educated (who take long views); those with parents, wives, or children (who are vulnerable). Also those not moved by courage (anger, confidence) or insolence (who ignore danger) or panic (who fear only for themselves). We must also believe some people are good; if we think nobody good, we think everyone deserves evil. Generally, we pity when we remember similar past misfortunes or expect future ones.

We pity destructive or painful evils: death, bodily injury, old age, disease, lack of food. Also evils due to chance: friendlessness, deformity, weakness, mutilation, disappointment (evil whence good was expected), repeated misfortune. Also good coming too late (gifts for Diopeithes after death), or inability to enjoy good fortune.

We pity those we know, but not too closely; for close relations, we feel terror, not pity. Amasis wept for his friend begging, not his son dying; the latter was terrible. The terrible casts out pity. We pity those like us in age, character, disposition, standing, or birth; their misfortune seems likely to befall us. What we fear for ourselves, we pity in others.

Since proximity excites pity, those who use gestures, tones, and dress to visualize the disaster succeed best. They make it seem close, just past or coming. Tokens (garments) and actions of sufferers are piteous. Most piteous is when noble persons suffer; their innocence and the vividness make the misfortune seem close.

Part 9

Indignation is the opposite of pity. It is pain at unmerited good fortune, just as pity is pain at unmerited bad fortune. Both spring from good character; we should sympathize with unmerited distress and resent unmerited prosperity, for the undeserved is unjust. Envy is akin to indignation but distinct. Envy is pain at the prosperity of equals; indignation is pain at the prosperity of the undeserving. If we fear the other's prosperity will harm us, the feeling becomes fear.

Opposite feelings attend pity and indignation. If we are pained by unmerited distress, we are pleased, or at least not pained, by merited distress (punishment). We rejoice at the prosperity of the deserving. These feelings belong to the same moral character. The malicious man, delighted by others' misfortunes, is identical with the envious man. He who is pained by a thing's existence is pleased by its destruction. All these feelings neutralize pity.

Indignation is pain at undeserved good fortune. We are not indignant at a man for being just or brave; we are indignant at wealth, power, or beauty when undeserved. We are more indignant if the possessor has only just got it; the newly rich offend more than the heirs of old wealth. What is long established seems natural and real.

We are indignant when anyone gets what is inappropriate. Brave men deserve fine weapons; men of family deserve distinguished marriages. We are indignant when an inferior contends with a superior, especially in the superior's own field.

We feel indignation if we deserve and have great goods, for it is unjust that inferiors should equal us. We feel it if we are good and honest, loathing injustice. We feel it if we are ambitious for what others get undeservedly. Generally, if we think we deserve a thing and others do not, we are indignant. Servile and unambitious men are not indignant, for they think they deserve nothing.

If the speech puts the judges into this frame of mind and shows the claimant deserves no pity, they will feel none.

Part 10

Envy is pain at the good fortune of equals—not because we want it, but because they have it. Equals are those comparable in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth. We feel it if we fall just short of having everything; hence the high-placed are envious, thinking others take what is theirs.

Ambitious men are more envious than others; so are the small-minded, to whom everything seems great. We envy things that bring honor and fame. We envy those near us in time, place, age, or reputation. "Kin can even be jealous of their kin." We envy rivals in sport or love. "Potter against potter."

We envy those whose success is a reproach to us (our equals), showing we missed the good thing by our own fault. We envy those who have what we ought to have, or once had. Old men envy the young; the spendthrift envies the thrifty.

Part 11

Emulation is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons like ourselves, of highly valued good things possible for us to acquire. It is felt not because others have them, but because we do not. It is a good feeling felt by good persons; envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons. Emulation moves us to secure the goods; envy moves us to stop our neighbor from having them.

Emulation is felt by those who believe they deserve good things they lack. No one aspires to the impossible. It is felt by the young and the lofty-minded. Also by those possessing honourable goods (wealth, friends, office), who feel they ought to be good men and therefore deserve such goods. Also by those whom others think deserving. We emulate others in things for which our ancestors or friends are honoured, feeling we deserve them.

Objects of emulation are moral goodness and things useful to others, for men honour the good and the helpful. Also goods that give enjoyment to neighbors, like wealth and beauty.

Objects of emulation are persons who possess these things—courage, wisdom, office. Generals and orators can help many. We emulate those whom many wish to be like, who have many friends, whom we admire, or whom poets praise.

Opposite to emulation is contempt. We despise those subject to bad things contrary to the objects of emulation. We often despise the fortunate who lack honourable goods.

This completes our discussion of the emotions.

Part 12

Let us consider character in relation to emotions and moral qualities, corresponding to age and fortune. Ages are youth, prime, and old age. Fortune is birth, wealth, power, and their opposites.

Young men have strong passions and gratify them indiscriminately. They are swayed most by sexual desire, lacking self-control. Their desires are changeable, fickle, and violent but short-lived; their impulses are keen but not deep. They are hot-tempered, quick to anger, and unable to bear slights, loving honour and victory more than money. They love victory because they desire superiority. They love money little, having never known want.

They are optimistic, trusting others readily because they have not been cheated often. Nature warms their blood like wine. They live in expectation, not memory; youth has a long future and a short past. This makes them easily cheated. Their hot tempers and hopefulness make them courageous; anger prevents fear, and hope creates confidence. They are shy, accepting social rules. They have exalted notions, not yet humbled by life. They prefer noble deeds to useful ones, living by feeling rather than reasoning. They are fond of friends and companions for the sake of company, not utility.

They overdo everything, loving and hating too much. They think they know everything and are sure of it. Their wrongs are insults, not malice. They pity others, thinking everyone better than he is, judging by their own harmless natures. They are fond of fun and witty, for wit is well-bred insolence.

Part 13

Elderly men are the contrary. Having lived long and been often deceived, they are sure about nothing and under-do everything. They "think" but never "know," always adding "possibly" or "perhaps." They are cynical, putting the worse construction on everything. They are suspicious and therefore distrustful. They neither love warmly nor hate bitterly; they love as if they will some day hate, and hate as if they will some day love.

They are small-minded, having been humbled by life; they desire only what keeps them alive. They are not generous; experience has taught them money is hard to get and easy to lose. They are cowardly and always anticipating danger; old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a chill. They love life, especially at the end, desiring most what they lack. They are selfish, guiding their lives by the useful rather than the noble. They are shameless, caring less for opinion than for profit.

They lack confidence, partly from experience (things go wrong), partly from cowardice. They live by memory, not hope; the past is long, the future short. This makes them loquacious; they enjoy remembering. Their anger is sudden but feeble. Their passions are weak or gone; they are guided by the love of gain. They seem self-controlled because their passions have slackened and they are slaves to gain. They live by reasoning (utility), not moral feeling (goodness). Their wrongs are injuries, not insults. They pity out of weakness, imagining every evil may befall them. They are querulous, not witty.

Such are the characters of young and elderly men. People approve speeches reflecting their own character; we can now adapt our speeches accordingly.

Part 14

Men in their prime have a character between the young and the old, free from the extremes of either. They have neither rash confidence nor excessive timidity, but the right amount of each. They neither trust nor distrust everybody, but judge correctly. They guide their lives by both the noble and the useful, neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but fitting. They are brave as well as temperate, and temperate as well as brave. Young men are brave but intemperate; old men, temperate but cowardly. The prime of life unites the valuable qualities of both and replaces their excesses with moderation. The body is in its prime from thirty to thirty-five; the mind, about forty-nine.

Part 15

Now let us consider the Gifts of Fortune and their effect on character. First, Good Birth. It makes men ambitious; men with a start in life wish to add to it. Good birth implies ancestral distinction. The well-born look down even on those as good as their ancestors, for distant distinction seems greater than recent. Being well-born (coming from fine stock) differs from nobility (being true to the family nature). Most well-born men are poor creatures. Like fruits of the earth, families have varying yields. A good stock produces exceptional men for a while, then degenerates. Clever stocks degenerate toward insanity (Alcibiades, Dionysius); steady stocks toward stupidity (Cimon, Pericles, Socrates).

Part 16

Wealth produces a character easy to see. Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant, affected by their possessions. They feel they have every good thing; wealth becomes the standard of value, and they imagine it buys everything. They are luxurious and ostentatious. Luxurious from living in prosperity; ostentatious and vulgar because they think everyone admires what they admire. Naturally, many beg from them. As Simonides told Hiero's wife, it is better to be rich than wise, "for I see the wise men spending their days at the rich men's doors."

Rich men consider themselves worthy of public office, thinking they possess what gives a claim to it. In short, the wealthy character is that of a prosperous fool. The newly rich are worse than the old rich; they lack education in riches. Their wrongs spring from insolence or self-indulgence, not malice—assault or adultery.

Part 17

Power produces a character partly like the wealthy, partly better. The powerful are more ambitious and manly, aspiring to great deeds. Responsibility makes them serious. They are dignified rather than arrogant—dignity being mild arrogance. Their wrongs are great, not small.

Good fortune produces characters like those described, since these conditions are forms of good fortune. It leads us to gain family happiness and bodily advantages. It makes men supercilious and reckless, but also pious, respecting the divine power because of their luck.

The characters of the poor, unfortunate, and powerless are the opposites of those described.

Part 18

Persuasive speech leads to decisions. Even when addressing a single person (as in scolding), he is your judge. In arguing against a proposition, we still attack arguments as if they were opponents. In ceremonial speeches, onlookers are judges. Strictly, a judge decides public controversies (lawsuits, debates). We have already discussed the characters marking different constitutions.

We have now set forth how to invest speeches with moral character.

We have noted the special arguments for each division of oratory—political, ceremonial, and forensic. We must now discuss arguments common to all: Possible and Impossible, Past and Future, and Size (Amplification). Amplification suits ceremonial speeches; the Past, forensic; Possibility and the Future, political.

Part 19

Let us discuss the Possible and Impossible.

Arguments for possibility:

1. If one contrary is possible, so is the other (if a man can be cured, he can fall ill).
2. If one of two similar things is possible, so is the other.
3. If the harder is possible, so is the easier.
4. If a thing can exist in a good form, it can exist generally (if a beautiful house, then a house).
5. If the beginning can occur, so can the end; if the end, so the beginning.
6. If the posterior can occur, so can the prior (if a man, then a boy).
7. Things we love or desire are usually possible.
8. Things subject to art or science are possible.
9. Things whose production depends on us (by compulsion, persuasion, or strength) are possible.
10. If the parts are possible, so is the whole; and vice versa.
11. If the genus is possible, so is the species; and vice versa.
12. If one of two mutually dependent things is possible, so is the other (if double, then half).
13. If a thing can be produced without art, it can be produced with art.
14. If inferior people can do it, superior people can.

For Impossibility, use the contrary arguments.

Arguments for Past Fact:

1. If the less likely occurred, the more likely occurred.
2. If the antecedent occurred, the consequent likely occurred (if he forgot, he once knew).
3. If a man had the power and the wish, he did it.
4. If he intended it and was not prevented; or if he had the power and was angry or craving.
5. If he was "going to do it," he likely did it.
6. If the natural antecedent occurred (lightning), the consequent occurred (thunder); and vice versa.

Arguments for Future Fact:

1. If a man has power and wish, he will do it.
2. If he is setting about it, or means to do it.
3. If the natural antecedent has happened (clouds), the consequent will happen (rain).

For Greatness and Smallness (Amplification), use the arguments from deliberative oratory on relative goods. Every orator amplifies utility, nobleness, or justice. Practical facts count more than abstract laws.

Part 20

Argument by Example has the nature of induction. It has two varieties: mentioning actual past facts, or inventing facts. Invention includes illustrative parallels and fables (like Aesop's).

Actual fact: "We must prepare for war against Persia and not let him subdue Egypt. Darius did not cross the Aegean until he seized Egypt; Xerxes did not attack until he seized Egypt. If the present king seizes Egypt, he will cross."

Illustrative parallel (Socrates): "Public officials should not be selected by lot. That is like selecting athletes by lot instead of by fitness, or steersmen by lot instead of by skill."

Fables: Stesichorus told the people of Himera, who were giving Phalaris a bodyguard, the fable of the horse and the stag. The horse, wishing to revenge himself on the stag, let a man bridle and mount him. He got his revenge but became a slave. "Take care," said Stesichorus, "lest in your desire for revenge you become slaves to Phalaris."

Aesop told the Samians the fable of the fox and the fleas. A fox, stuck in a river, declined a hedgehog's offer to remove her fleas. "These are full," she said; "fresh ones would drink all my blood." Aesop applied this to a popular leader: "He is wealthy; if you kill him, poor men will come and empty your treasury."

Fables are easy to invent and suitable for popular addresses. However, actual past events are more valuable for political speakers, since the future usually resembles the past.

If we cannot argue by Enthymeme, we must use Examples as demonstration. If we can, we should use Examples as supplementary evidence following the Enthymeme. Preceding examples look like induction; following examples look like witnesses. If first, use many; if last, one is sufficient.

Part 21

A Maxim is a general statement about practical conduct, concerning what should be chosen or avoided. Since Enthymemes deal with such subjects, their premises or conclusions are often maxims. "Never should any man... Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows" is a maxim; add the reason ("It makes them idle..."), and it becomes an Enthymeme.

Maxims may or may not have a supplement. Paradoxical or disputable maxims need proof. Known truths or self-evident views do not. "Chiefest of blessings is health..." is a known truth. "No love is true save that which loves for ever" is self-evident.

Some maxims with supplements are part of an Enthymeme. Others are Enthymemes in essence but not form; these are the best. "O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath." The word "mortal" implies the reason.

If a view is paradoxical, put the supplement first and make the maxim the conclusion. "Since unpopularity is undesirable, it is better not to be educated." If not paradoxical but not obvious, add the reason concisely. Stesichorus said: "Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicalas chirp on the ground."

Maxims suit elderly men speaking on experienced subjects. For a young man to use them is unbecoming; for the inexperienced, silly. Country fellows strike out maxims readily.

To declare a thing universally true when it is not is appropriate for exciting horror or indignation. Even hackneyed maxims are useful; their commonness suggests truth. "The War-God showeth no favour." "Fool, who slayeth the father..."

Some proverbs are maxims ("An Attic neighbour"). Contradict common maxims if it raises your character or conveys strong emotion. "It is not true that we ought to know ourselves; had this man known himself, he would never have commanded." "We ought not to treat friends as future enemies, but enemies as future friends." Imply the moral purpose in the wording, or add a reason.

Maxims help because unlearned hearers love to hear their own specific opinions expressed as universal truths. If a man has bad neighbors, he agrees that "Nothing is more annoying than having neighbors." The orator must guess the audience's views and express them as general truths.

Most importantly, maxims invest a speech with moral character. They declare moral principles; if the maxims are sound, the speaker appears good.

Part 22

We now come to Enthymemes: how to look for them and the lines of argument they embody. The Enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism. Unlike the dialectical syllogism, it should not reason too far back (causing obscurity) or include every step (wasting words). Uneducated speakers are more effective with crowds because they argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions, whereas the educated lay down general principles. We must start from opinions accepted by our judges or their authorities, and base arguments on probabilities as well as certainties.

We must know the facts of our subject. To advise Athenians on war, we must know their strength, revenues, friends, and enemies. To eulogize them, we must know their deeds at Salamis or Marathon. Invectives rely on opposite facts. In court, we must know the facts of the case. Whether the subject is Achilles or justice, we must know the facts about him or it.

Proof requires facts bearing on the matter. We must select arguments suitable to the subject. We should think out arguments for special needs by keeping our eyes on actual facts. The more actual facts we have, the easier the proof; the more closely they bear on the subject, the less commonplace they seem. Commonplaces (like praising Achilles for being human) apply to many; special facts (slaying Hector) apply to him alone.

There are two kinds of enthymemes: demonstrative (proving a proposition) and refutative (disproving one). Demonstrative enthymemes join compatible propositions; refutative ones join incompatible propositions.

We have the lines of argument for special subjects (good, evil, justice, character). We must now consider the subject generally, distinguishing lines of proof from disproof, and valid enthymemes from sham ones. Then we will classify Objections and Refutations.

Part 23

Here are lines of argument for Enthymemes:

1. Opposites. Observe whether the opposite of your subject has the opposite quality. If war causes our troubles, peace will put them right.

2. Modifications of the key-word. What applies to "just" may not apply to "justly."

3. Correlative ideas. If it was right for A to command, it was right for B to obey. But check if it was right for A to command B specifically.

4. A fortiori. If the gods are not omniscient, certainly men are not. If a quality is absent where most likely, it is absent where less likely. If Hector did well to slay Patroclus, Paris did well to slay Achilles.

5. Time. If I had bargained for a statue before doing the deed, you would have granted it; will you refuse now that I have done it?

6. Turning the tables. Apply the opponent's words to himself. "Would you, Aristophon, betray the fleet?" "No." "Then would I, Iphicrates?" This works only if you are clearly less likely to commit the crime.

7. Definition. Define terms like "supernatural" or "noble" and reason from the definition. "Goodness is true nobility."

8. Ambiguity. Use the various senses of a word.

9. Logical division. "All men do wrong from motive A, B, or C. I did not act from A or B; you do not allege C."

10. Induction. From the case of the woman of Peparethus, argue that women everywhere know the truth about their children.

11. Previous decisions. Appeal to decisions by the same judges, or by wise men, or by gods. "Death is evil; the gods have so judged it, or they would die."

12. Parts of a subject. "What temple has he profaned? What gods has he not honoured?"

13. Consequences. Use good and bad consequences to urge or discourage. Education leads to unpopularity (bad) and wisdom (good).

14. Dilemma (Divarication). If you speak right, men will hate you; if wrong, the gods will hate you. Reply: If right, gods love you; if wrong, men love you.

15. Contradicting common opinion. Men praise justice openly but prefer advantage secretly. Establish the view your opponent has not adopted.

16. Rational correspondence. If tall boys are men, short men are boys.

17. Identical antecedents. If "giving earth and water" and "sharing the Common Peace" both mean slavery, treat them as the same.

18. Inconsistency. Men change their minds. "When exiles, we fought to return; now returned, we choose exile to avoid fighting."

19. Possible motive. Assert a possible motive is the real one. God gives prosperity to make ruin more conspicuous.

20. Inducements and deterrents. Urge action if possible, easy, and useful; or if loss is outweighed by gain.

21. Incredible truth. Argue that a thing is so incredible it must be true, for no one would invent it. "Olive-cakes need oil."

22. Contradictions. Point out inconsistencies in dates, acts, or words. "He says he loves you, yet conspired with the Thirty."

23. Explaining false impressions. Show why facts are not as supposed. The woman embraced her son, not her lover.

24. Cause and effect. If the cause is present, the effect is present. If the record was erased, the Thirty must have trusted me.

25. Better course. If the accused could have taken a better course, he is innocent (since men choose the best). Fallacious, as the better course is often seen only later.

26. Inconsistency with past action. "Do not mourn Leucothea if she is a goddess; do not sacrifice if she is a woman."

27. Previous mistakes. Medea made the mistake of sending her children away; she would have killed Jason, not them.

28. Names. Draw meanings from names. "Steel in heart as in name." "Pentheus-a name foreshadowing grief."

Refutative Enthymemes are more popular than Demonstrative ones because they are clearer. The best syllogisms are those whose conclusions we foresee or grasp immediately.

Part 24

Spurious Enthymemes look genuine but are not.

1. Word-play. (a) Summary conclusion. Listing separate facts (he saved some, avenged others, freed Greeks) to create the impression of a fresh conclusion. (b) Homonyms. Arguing the mouse is noble because the Mysteries are "most august" (mysterion/mys). Or praising the dog because of the dog-star.

2. Part and Whole. Asserting of the whole what is true of parts, or vice versa. "Thrasybulus put down thirty tyrants" (adding them up). Or: "It is right to kill a husband-slayer; it is right for a son to avenge his father; therefore Orestes did right." The fallacy lies in omitting context (by whose hand?).

3. Indignant Language. Painting a high-colored picture without proof. The prosecutor's passion implies guilt; the defendant's, innocence.

4. Sign (Single Instance). "Lovers are useful to countries, for Harmodius and Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrant." "Dionysius is a thief because he is vicious." (Invalid: not all vicious men are thieves).

5. Accidental as Essential. "The mice came to the rescue because they gnawed the bowstrings." (They gnawed because hungry). "Achilles was angered because he was not invited." (He was angered by the insult, not the missed dinner).

6. Consequence. "Paris had a lofty soul because he lived on Ida." (Lofty people do, but so do others). "He is a rake because he dresses fashionably." (Rakes do, but not all fashionable men are rakes).

7. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. "Demosthenes' policy caused the mischief, for the war happened after it."

8. Omitting Time and Circumstance. "Paris was justified because Helen's father gave her choice." (Choice was for her first marriage only). "Striking a free man is outrage." (Only if unprovoked).

9. Absolute vs. Particular. Confusing particular probability with absolute probability.

Part 25

We refute arguments by counter-syllogism or objection.

Counter-syllogisms are built from ordinary opinions, which often contradict each other.

Objections are raised in four ways:

1. Attacking the statement itself. If the opponent says "Love is always good," object that "All want is evil" (general) or "Caunian love is evil" (particular).
2. From a contrary statement. If "A good man does good to all friends," object that "A bad man does not do evil to all friends."
3. From a like statement. If "Ill-used men hate their ill-users," object that "Well-used men do not always love their well-users."
4. From decisions. If "Drunken offenders should be pardoned for ignorance," object that "Pittacus prescribed severe penalties for them."

Enthymemes are based on Probabilities, Examples, Infallible Signs, or Ordinary Signs.

1. Probabilities. These argue from what is usually true. They can always be refuted by showing they are not inevitably true. This gives the defense an advantage. However, judges should decide on likelihood, not just certainty. The defendant should show the charge is not likely true, by stating what is more usually true.

2. Fallible Signs. These can be refuted even if the facts are correct, for they do not form a valid logical proof.

3. Examples. Refuted like probabilities. A single negative instance refutes inevitability. If the opponent has more examples, argue that the present case is unlike them.

4. Infallible Signs. If the fact is admitted, these cannot be refuted.

Part 26

Amplification and Depreciation are not elements of an enthymeme (lines of argument), but kinds of enthymeme used to show greatness or smallness.

Refutative Enthymemes are not a different species from Constructive ones. Refutation involves proving the opposite or raising an objection. Proving the opposite uses the same means as construction. An objection is not an enthymeme but a statement showing the opponent reasoned incorrectly or falsely.

We have now discussed the thought-element (Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes). We must next discuss Style and Arrangement.

BOOK III

Part 1

A speech requires three studies: persuasion, style, and arrangement. We have covered persuasion (emotions, character, proof) and enthymemes.

Now we discuss style. It is not enough to know what to say; we must say it rightly.

Delivery (voice management, volume, pitch, rhythm) affects success but has been neglected. It is essential for persuasion because of the hearer's defects; ideally, facts alone should suffice. Delivery is acting; it can be taught.

Poets first developed style. Prose initially copied poetry (Gorgias), but they are distinct. Even tragedy has dropped high-flown language for the iambic meter, which resembles speech. We should not imitate a poetic manner that poets themselves have dropped.

Part 2

Good style must be clear and appropriate. If speech is not clear, it fails. It must be neither mean nor unduly elevated. Clearness comes from using current, ordinary words. Distinction comes from strange words, metaphors, and lengthened forms, as in poetry. But in prose, these must be used sparingly; the subject matter is less exalted.

A writer must disguise his art and seem natural. Naturalness persuades; artificiality makes people suspicious. We can hide our art by selecting words from ordinary speech, as Euripides did.

Metaphor is the prose writer's chief resource, giving clearness, charm, and distinction. Metaphors must be fitting. If you wish to compliment, take the metaphor from something better; if to disparage, from something worse. Iphicrates called Callias a "mendicant priest"; Callias called himself a "torch-bearer." Pirates call themselves "purveyors."

Metaphors must sound good. "Calliope's screech" is bad because "screech" is discordant. Metaphors should come from kindred things. A cup is the "shield of Dionysus"; a shield, the "cup of Ares."

Words are not interchangeable; some are fairer or fouler than others. "Rosy-fingered morn" is better than "red-fingered." Epithets can also be good or bad: "mother-slayer" vs. "father's avenger." Diminutives (like "goldlet") make things seem less important.

Part 3

Bad taste in language takes four forms:

1. Misuse of compound words. (Lycophron's "many-visaged heaven").
2. Strange words. (Alcidamas' "witlessness of nature").
3. Long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets. Alcidamas uses them as meat, not seasoning. He says "moist sweat" instead of "sweat," and "laws that are monarchs" instead of "laws." This makes speech obscure and tasteless.
4. Inappropriate metaphors. Some are ridiculous, some too grand or theatrical (Gorgias' "events green and full of sap").

Compounds suit dithyrambs; strange words, epics; metaphors, iambics (and prose).

Part 4

The Simile is a metaphor with a slight difference. "He leapt as a lion" is a simile; "the lion leapt" is a metaphor. Similes are useful in prose but less often than in verse. They are employed like metaphors.

Examples:

• Idrieus was like a terrier let off the chain.
• Those who strip the dead are like curs biting stones.
• The Athenian people are like a strong but deaf captain.
• Poets' verses are like beautiful youths who lose their charm with age.
• Pericles compared the Samians to children crying while taking pap.
• Demosthenes compared the people to seasick men.

All these can be expressed as similes or metaphors. Similes without the explanation are metaphors.

Part 5

The foundation of good style is correctness.

1. Connectives. Use them in natural sequence. Do not separate the answer widely from the first word. "But as soon as he told me (for Cleon had come...), took them..." is obscure.
2. Specific names. Call things by their special names, not vague ones.
3. Ambiguity. Avoid it, unless you intend to mislead (like diviners). Diviners use generalities to avoid being wrong ("Croesus will ruin a mighty realm").
4. Gender. Observe proper gender (Protagoras' rule).
5. Number. Express plurality, fewness, and unity correctly.

Composition should be easy to read and deliver. Avoid many connectives or hard punctuation (like Heracleitus, where it is unclear if "always" goes with what precedes or follows). Avoid solecisms like annexing a verb to two terms that don't fit both ("perceive" fits sound and color; "see" does not). Avoid parenthesis that interrupts the sense.

Part 6

Suggestions for impressiveness:

1. Describe instead of name. Say "the surface extending equally from the center" instead of "circle." For conciseness, do the opposite.
2. Use metaphors and epithets (avoiding poetical effects).
3. Use plural for singular ("Unto havens Achaean").
4. Repeat the article ("that wife of ours" vs "our wife").
5. Use plenty of connectives. For conciseness, dispense with them but preserve connection.
6. Describe by negation (Antimachus). Mention attributes a thing does not possess ("stringless melody").

Part 7

Style should be appropriate to the subject, emotion, and character. Do not speak casually of weighty matters or solemnly of trivial ones. Do not add ornamental epithets to commonplace nouns ("O queenly fig-tree").

Express emotion: anger for outrage, disgust for impiety. Apt language makes people believe the story; they think you are truthful because you sound like others do when such things happen. An emotional speaker makes the audience feel with him.

Express character. A rustic and an educated man speak differently. Use the words appropriate to the speaker's age, sex, and nationality.

Counteract exaggeration by criticizing yourself. Do not make everything correspond exactly (voice, face, words), or artifice appears. If words are harsh, do not make voice and face harsh too.

Compound words and epithets suit emotional speeches. We forgive an angry man for calling a wrong "heaven-high." This language fits poetry and deep emotion.

Part 8

Prose should be rhythmical but not metrical. Meter makes the hearer suspicious of artifice. But language without rhythm is unlimited and vague; number limits all things.

The heroic rhythm is dignified but not conversational. The iambic is conversational but lacks dignity. The trochee is too like dancing. The paean (ratio 3:2) is best. It is less obtrusive.

Use one kind of paean for the beginning (long syllable followed by three short) and the opposite for the end (three short followed by a long). The long syllable at the end gives a sense of closure.

Part 9

Prose must be either free-running (like Herodotus) or periodic.

Free-running style has no natural stops, ending only when the subject ends. It is unsatisfying because indefinite; we like to see the goal.

Periodic style is divided into periods. A period is a portion of speech with a beginning and end, easily grasped. It is satisfying and easy to follow and remember (because numbered).

Periods should not break off abruptly. They may be simple (one member) or divided (several members). Members should be neither curt nor long.

Periodic style is either simply divided or antithetical. Antithesis puts opposites together ("They aided both those who stayed and those who went"). This is satisfying because the contrast is clear and logical.

Parisosis makes members equal in length. Paromoeosis makes them sound alike at the beginning or end (rhyme, alliteration).

Part 10

Lively and taking sayings come from natural talent or practice, but we can analyze them.

We like learning easily. Strange words puzzle; ordinary words convey old news. Metaphor brings fresh knowledge. "Old age is a withered stalk" teaches us through the common notion of bloom lost. Similes do the same but are less attractive because longer and less direct.

Lively speech makes us seize a new idea promptly. We dislike the obvious and the puzzling. We like the antithetical form ("judging peace a war") and the metaphorical. Metaphors must not be far-fetched or obvious. They should set the scene before our eyes (Actuality).

The proportional metaphor is best.

• Pericles: "The spring taken out of the year."
• Leptines: "Greece losing one of her two eyes."
• Cephisodotus: "Fingers on the people's throat." "Painted millstones."
• Iphicrates: "Stripped of travelling money for the war."
• Peitholaus: "The people's big stick."
• Moerocles: "His rascality pays 30%."
• Lycoleon: "The bronze statue intercedes."

Graphic metaphors imply activity or visibility. "God kindled reason as a lamp." "Postponing wars, not ending them."

Part 11

Making hearers "see things" means representing them in activity. "With his vigour in full bloom" suggests activity; "four-square" does not. Homer constantly gives metaphorical life to lifeless things: "The arrow flew," "The spear drove." He represents everything as moving and living.

Draw metaphors from related but not obvious things. Archytas called an arbitrator and an altar the same (both are refuges). An anchor and a hook are the same (one secures from below, one from above).

Surprise conveys liveliness. When words mean something different from what they say, or when a new idea contradicts the old, the hearer is impressed. "The cicalas will chirp on the ground." "His feet were shod with his—chilblains" (surprise ending).

Jokes often depend on double meanings or slight changes in letters. "You Thracian slavey" (Thratt' ei su) sounds like "You harpplayer" (Thratteis su). "The empire (arche) of the sea was not the beginning (arche) of troubles."

The best sayings are brief and antithetical. "Death is most fit before you do deeds that would make death fit for you." This impresses the new idea firmly and quickly.

Part 12

Each kind of rhetoric has its own style. Written prose differs from spoken; political from forensic.

Written style is more finished. Spoken style admits dramatic delivery. Professional speeches often sound thin in contests, while orators' speeches look amateurish when read. This is because the latter suit the tussle; unconnected words and repetitions, condemned in writing, work dramatically in speech (if varied in tone).

Political oratory is like scene-painting: the bigger the crowd, the more distant the view, and exactness is unnecessary. Forensic oratory requires more exactness, especially before a single judge. A single judge is easily persuaded; he sees the point quickly.

Ceremonial oratory is most literary, being meant for reading; forensic is second.

To be clear, do not be chatty or emotional if you want to be exact. If you want to be dramatic, do not be exact.

Part 13

A speech has two essential parts: Statement and Argument. You state your case and prove it. It is impossible to state without proving, or prove without stating.

The current division is absurd. "Narration" belongs properly to forensic speech. Introduction, comparison, and recapitulation are not always needed.

The necessary parts are Statement and Argument. At most, a speech has Introduction, Statement, Argument, and Epilogue. Refutation and Comparison are parts of the Argument. Inventing new names like "post-narration" (Theodorus) is pointless unless they indicate real species.

Part 14

The Introduction begins the speech, like a prologue or prelude.

In speeches of display, introductions resemble musical preludes—brilliant passages fitted to the opening. The writer begins with what takes his fancy (praise, censure, advice, or appeal).

Forensic introductions resemble dramatic prologues: they preview the theme. "Sing, O goddess, of the Wrath." This is the essential function: to show the aim. If the subject is short and plain, no introduction is needed.

Other introductions are remedial, concerned with the speaker, hearer, subject, or opponent. The defendant removes prejudice at the start; the prosecutor excites it at the close. The defendant must clear obstacles to get a hearing; the prosecutor must make the memory stick.

Appeals to the hearer aim at goodwill, resentment, attention, or distraction. Attention is highest at the beginning, so calls for it are often ridiculous there; use them where interest flags ("Slip in a bit of the fifty-drachma lecture").

Political introductions are rare because the subject is known. They are used to handle prejudice or magnify/minimize importance.

Part 15

To dispel prejudice:

1. Deny the fact.
2. Admit the fact but deny the harm.
3. Admit the harm but deny the injustice.
4. Admit the wrong but argue it was honorable (or accidental, or mistaken, or necessary). Sophocles said he trembled not from age but necessity.
5. Balance motive against deed. "I did not mean to injure him."
6. Point out that the calumniator (or his friends) is subject to the same suspicion.
7. Point out that admitted innocents are subject to the same suspicion. "Must I be a profligate because I am well-groomed?"
8. Return calumny for calumny. "Monstrous to trust the man's statements when you cannot trust the man."
9. Appeal to previous decisions. Euripides replied to Hygiaenon: "I have answered for my words in the Dionysiac contests; I am ready to do so there again."
10. Denounce calumny itself.

To create prejudice, select the worse motive. To remove it, put the better construction on it.

Part 16

Narration in ceremonial oratory is intermittent. You must survey the actions, but proof is rarely needed. Do not make the narrative continuous; apply the facts. Narrate deeds only if they are not well-known.

Absurdly, some say narration should be rapid. It should be right—neither long nor curt, but sufficient to make facts plain and credible.

Narrate anything creditable to yourself or discreditable to your adversary ("He answered he would find other children"). The defendant narrating should be brief, maintaining the thing did not happen, or was not wrong. Speak of past events as past, unless exciting pity or indignation.

Narration should depict character by indicating moral purpose. Mathematical discourses show no character (no purpose); Socratic dialogues do. Describe manifestations of character ("He walked as he talked").

Do not seem inspired by intelligence (which seeks the useful) but by purpose (which seeks the noble). If a detail is incredible, add the cause (Antigone caring more for her brother than husband). If you have no cause, say so.

Use emotions. Relate familiar manifestations ("He went away scowling"). Bring yourself on stage in the right character from the start.

Political oratory has little narration (of the future), unless recalling the past to help plans or attack character. If a statement is hard to believe, guarantee its truth and explain.

Part 17

Arguments attempt demonstrative proofs. The dispute falls under four heads:

1. Fact. (Did it happen?)
2. Harm. (Did it do harm?)
3. Importance. (Was it less than alleged?)
4. Justice. (Was it justified?)

Only in the first case is one party necessarily a rogue (ignorance is no plea).

In ceremonial speeches, argue that the deed was noble and useful. The facts are usually taken on trust; prove them only if incredible.

In political speeches, maintain the proposal is impracticable, unjust, useless, or unimportant. Attack falsehoods in irrelevant matters to discredit the rest. Use examples (past events) rather than enthymemes (which suit forensic oratory better, dealing with non-contingent past facts). Do not use enthymemes incessantly; intersperse them. Do not use them when rousing emotion (it kills the feeling) or depicting character (demonstration shows no moral purpose). Use maxims for character.

If you have no enthymemes, fall back on moral discourse; it suits a good man better than subtle reasoning. Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative.

Reply to the Opponent is part of the Argument. If speaking first, put your arguments first, then refute. If the other side has strong arguments, demolish them first (like Callistratus). If speaking later, attack the opponent's speech first to clear the ground.

For moral character, put invidious remarks into a third person's mouth (as Isocrates and Sophocles do). Restate enthymemes as maxims.

Part 18

Use Interrogation when the opponent's answer to one question makes the next one fatal. Pericles asked Lampon: "No uninitiated person can be told the rites?" "No." "Do you know them?" "Yes." "How, being uninitiated?"

Use it when one premise is obvious and the other must be admitted. Do not ask the obvious one; state the conclusion. Socrates asked Meletus: "Are not supernatural beings children of gods?" "Yes." "Then does anyone believe in children of gods but not gods?"

Do not question if the opponent has a good answer ("True, but..."). Do not ask a series of questions; the audience cannot follow.

Reply to ambiguous questions by distinguishing. Reply to contradictions by explaining immediately.

Kill earnestness with jesting, and jesting with earnestness (Gorgias). Irony befits a gentleman (amusing himself); buffoonery befits a buffoon (amusing others).

Part 19

The Epilogue has four parts:

1. Make the audience well-disposed to you and ill-disposed to your opponent. Commend yourself, censure him.
2. Magnify or minimize the leading facts. The facts being proved, show their importance.
3. Excite emotions: pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, pugnacity.
4. Refresh memories. Review what you have said. Contrast your case with your opponent's: "He said this; I said that, and for this reason."

End with a disconnected style to mark the close: "I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement."